TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER NAFTA: WHERE FROM HERE? by Meilke, Karl D. & Huff, Karen
TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  UNDER  NAFTA:
WHERE  FROM  HERE?
Karl D. Meilke and Karen Huff
INTRODUCTION
The theme for this workshop is Trade Liberalization  Under  NAFTA: A
Report Card on Agriculture.  This paper strays  from the narrow  focus  of the
NAFTA  trading relationship  and focuses  initially on  the general  environment
for trade liberalization.  The multilateral environment  is the "canvass"  against
which  the NAFTA  and  other regional  trading relationships  will evolve.  It is
worth  noting that a decade  following the signing of the Canada-United  States
Free Trade Agreement, approximately  $Can. 1 billion per day of goods and ser-
vices  are  exported from  Canada to the United States.  Two-way trade  in agri-
food products between  Canada and the United  States  totals  about $Can.  2 bil-
lion per month.  Most of this trade takes  place in a frictionless  and duty free
environment.  However,  the existence of this workshop suggests  that there are
still  trade irritants,  and that these troublesome  issues  often  involve  agri-food
products.
If you take  a long view  of trade liberalization,  it is apparent  that the
global trading system is in an extremely  interesting transition period.  Follow-
ing the  Great  Depression  and  after  World War  II,  industrial  tariffs  averaged
about 40 percent;  now  they average about 4 percent.  In  some sense, the work
started  in the  1940s  to lower  tariffs  on  industrial  goods  is nearly  complete.Meile  an  Huf  31
While it is not entirely  correct to  say  agri-food  was  excluded from the trade
liberalization  process,  until  the Uruguay  Round  of trade  negotiations  (com-
pleted in 1994)  not much of substance was accomplished until then.
The  agricultural  trade  situation  is  now at  the point  where  industrial
goods trade was 50 years  ago - just starting the process towards  trade liberal-
ization.  However, since agri-food trade can also be considered "trade in goods"
most of the lessons that were learned from liberalizing trade in industrial prod-
ucts continue  to hold.
AGRI-FOOD  TRADE  FOLLOWING THE  URUGUAY  ROUND
Most economists  would agree  that considerable  progress  was  made
towards liberalizing  trade in agri-food  products  during the Uruguay  Round of
trade negotiations.  The operative word in this sentence is "towards"  since the
degree  of actual liberalization  was  likely  modest.  A comparison  of the pro-
ducer support estimates from the start of the Uruguay Round (1986-88)  and the
preliminary figures  for  1998 illustrate  this point (OECD,  1999) 1 . In nominal
dollars,  the producer  support estimate  for the OECD  countries has increased
from  $US  246.6 billion  in  1986-88  to  $US  273.6  billion  in  1998  (Table  1).
However,  in  inflation  adjusted  terms  support has  declined  by  18.1  percent.
Changes  in  support  levels  since  1986-88  vary  widely  across  countries.  The
largest percentage increase in support has been in Mexico, where transfers have
increased from $US  1.7 billion to  $US 4.6 billion (170 percent).  Canada has
reduced its support significantly (-42.8 percent) while the European Union (EU)
has increased its support by 30.3 percent and the United States by 13.5 percent.
Another way  to judge protection  in the agri-food  sector is  to look at
tariffs.  Wainio, Gibson  and Whitley (1999) have recently provided some infor-
mation on agri-food tariff structures for the Quint Countries (Australia, Canada,
EU, Japan and the United States).  The most striking feature of their analysis is
1  The OECD has recently changed their terminology from producer subsidy equivalent
to producer support estimate.  These figures exclude about $US 60-65 billion in general
services  support (research,  infrastructure,  marketing  and promotion,  etc.) provided to
the agricultural  sector.
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that average ad valorem  tariffs  are quite low, ranging from 3.8  percent in Aus-
tralia to 9.5  percent  in Japan.  However,  as the authors point out, many  agri-
food products are protected by specific tariffs, or some combination of ad valo-
rem  and specific tariffs.  They use Canada to illustrate the effect of excluding
specific tariffs from the average tariff rate calculations.  Canada's average tariff
rate,  including  only  ad valorem  tariffs  (762 tariff lines)  is 4.8  percent,  but  it
jumps to 25.3 percent (917 tariff lines) when the ad valorem equivalent of spe-
cific  tariffs  is  included.  Some  over-quota  tariffs  in the  agri-food  sector  are
truly staggering  as illustrated by the tariffs for dairy products, that range  from
a low of 61 percent for cheese in the United States, to a high of 595 percent for
butter in Japan (Table  2).
WHAT  HAPPENED  IN  SEATTLE?
The Third WTO Ministerial  Meeting in Seattle was meant to kick-off
the next round of multilateral trade negotiations.  However,  the meetings were
adjourned  with  no  agreement having  been reached.  The  reasons for the col-
lapse  were many  and varied but had little to do with the protesters who filled
the streets of Seattle  and dominated the evening news broadcasts. The cover of
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Table 2:  Over-Quota  Tariffs for Dairy Products in Selected Countries
Country  Butter  Cheese  Milk Powder
Canada  351%  237 %  289%
EU15  134%  93  %  89.4%
Japan  595%  - 398%
USA  84.2%  61%  40.4%
Source:  WTO
best2. Under the heading "The Real Losers in Seattle" was the picture of a poor
child in a developing  country.  Some would have included a picture of a North
American grain farmer in the background.
Selling freer trade is always a difficult task.  Trading relationships  are
complex  and highly  controversial.  The  push towards  trade  liberalization  in
agri-food,  services, investment,  and intellectual property are  still in the begin-
ning stages3. It is not unusual to see moves towards freer trade interrupted by
periods of no progress,  or even backsliding.  Hence, the failure of Trade Minis-
ters to launch a new round in Seattle  is not particularly  unusual or surprising.
In fact, for economists  with memories of the Uruguay Round of trade negotia-
tions,  it  is reassuring  that  agri-food  trade  was  not the issue  that  caused  the
negotiations  to be  suspended.  However,  disagreements  about  the extent  and
pace  of liberalization  in agri-food  remain  deep-seated  between  the European
Union and Japan on the one side, and the major agri-food exporters,  including
some developing  country exporters  on the other side.
What  did cause  the negotiating  collapse,  and  what does  it mean  for
North America?  The failure to reach an agreement was caused by the lack of
political  will and leadership  - primarily by the United  States and the EU - to
forge the compromises  necessary  to launch a  new Round.  There  was  no re-
2  The Economist, December  11,  1999.  The Economist carried  an excellent  series  of
articles dealing with globalization  and the WTO negotiations  in the November 27, De-
cember 4, and December  11,  1999 issues.
3  Negotiations  on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment were held by the OECD,
however, when an agreement could not be reached some WTO member countries
were hoping to revive these negotiations in the WTO.
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spected  world leader willing to make the strong  case for freer trade4, and for
example, to point out:
* the benefits of specialization,  and the gains from trade;
* the benefits of liberalized trade in restraining imperfect competition;
* the benefits of liberalized trade for all countries,  rich and poor;
* the benefits of liberalized trade for the environment;
* the benefits of a transparent,  rules  based and nondiscriminatory
trading regime;  and
* the institutional  reforms that would result in the WTO being better
able to fulfill its mandate.
Negotiations on agri-food and services, as a result of the Uruguay Round
Agreement,  are mandated to begin in 2000.  However,  with no decision on the
scope of the next round of negotiations and no deadline,  it will be difficult to
make progress.  Realistically,  it seems unlikely  a new round will be kicked-off
prior to  the Fourth  Ministerial  Conference  scheduled  for late 2001.  Having
said this, the agri-food trade issues seem much clearer than they did at the start
of the last round.  So far, no one has suggested moving away from the negotiat-
ing  agenda  or "modalities"  established  during the Uruguay  Round.  At least
with respect to the old agenda of agri-food trade,  the question is one of "how-
far and how-fast."  In the next section, the old agenda of agri-food trade liberal-
ization  is  discussed  and the  key issues  are  highlighted.  Following this,  the
views of developing  countries are presented,  and the intersection  of their con-
cerns with the  new trade policy agenda  is outlined.
THE  AGENDA  FOR AGRI-FOOD  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION
The negotiating  modalities that were put in place during the Uruguay
Round were designed  to facilitate the future liberalization of agri-food trade in
the areas of export subsidies, market access, and domestic support through the
Agreement on Agriculture; and some forms of non-tariff barriers to trade through
4 A number of political events resulted in negotiators from the European Union and the
United  States,  as well  as WTO officials, being ill prepared  to launch a new  Round in
December:  a lame duck President  in the United States and an election campaign  well
underway;  a new  European Commission  as a result of scandals  in Europe;  and a pro-
tracted debate in  the WTO about naming  a new Director General.
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the Agreements  on Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Regulations 5 and Technical
Barriers to Trade6.
Export Subsidies
Constraints  on both the volume and quantity of agricultural products
that qualify for export subsidies  were established  during the Uruguay Round.
In the next round, export subsidies on agricultural products will be totally elimi-
nated  or sharply  curtailed.  The  major  debate will  hinge  on the  question  of
"elimination"  versus "reduction"  of export subsidies, as well as various meth-
ods for circumventing  the export subsidy disciplines using export credits, food
aid and gray  area measures.
Market  Access
All non-tariff barriers  to trade were  converted  to bound tariffs during
the Uruguay Round7. The policy  instrument used to accomplish this feat, was
the tariff rate quota8. Tariff rate quotas, which are two-tier tariffs, have many of
the same  characteristics  as  import quotas,  and in some respects  increase rent
seeking by import quota holders (Moschini  1991,  Meilke and Lariviere 1999).
The next  round  will have  to deal  with the  intertwined  issues  of:  1)
reductions  of with-in quota tariff rates,  2) expansion in minimum access quan-
tities,  and  3) reductions  in  over-quota tariffs.  Analyzing  tariff rate  quota re-
gimes is  a difficult modeling  task, and the economic  effects can  vary greatly
depending on the policy instrument that is changed (Lariviere and Meilke 1999).
In addition,  the administration  of tariff rate  quotas  and  preferential  access
5 Trade in genetically enhanced organisms (biotechnology) was not an issue during the
Uruguay Round of negotiations, but trade in these products is subject  to the rules con-
tained in the Agreement on Sanitary  and Phytosanitary Regulations.
6  For the history of agricultural negotiations  under the GATT/WTO  the reader is
referred to Josling, Tangermann and Warley.  The future negotiating agenda is
discussed in Josling, and in the guide prepared  by the Canadian Agri-Food Trade
Research Network (Gervais et.  al 1999).
7  Bound tariffs cannot be increased without the importing  country paying compensa-
tion to the exporting nations.  Countries often "apply" tariffs lower than their bound
rates.
8  Tariff rate quotas were justified as a way to insure that minimum access  opportuni-
ties were not reduced when tariffs replaced import quotas.
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schemes will be given considerable scrutiny.  For example, the size of Canada's
over-quota  tariffs  on dairy products  are prohibitive,  but perhaps  no more pro-
tectionist than the practice of allocating country specific import quota to coun-
tries that do not have the ability to fill the quota (i.e. the United States ice cream
quota allocated to Jamaica that goes repeatedly  unfilled).  How to tackle tariff
mountains will be high on the negotiating agenda as will tariff escalation.  There
will  also be attempts  to  adopt zero-for-zero  schemes  for  certain  commodity
sectors (Meilke and Swidinsky  1998)9.
Domestic  Support
The constraints  on domestic support, that apply at the sector level, have
seldom been binding or constraining.  The creation of the amber, blue and green
boxes for domestic support has had the effect of encouraging countries to move
protection  from the most trade distorting  forms,  i.e.  open-ended  market price
supports  coupled  with border measures,  towards less trade distorting forms of
support.  This influence  is illustrated  in Table 3 where the OECD-24 producer
support estimate is decomposed,  according  to the type of support.  In 1986-88,
almost 90 percent of the support  and protection provided to producers came in
the form of market price supports, or payments based on output or area planted.
By  1998,  the fraction  of support coming from these most trade distorting do-
mestic policies  had  dropped  modestly  to  83.7 percent.  The  fastest  growing
category of support is payments  based on historical  entitlements.
As a result of the incentives built into the Uruguay Round Agreement,
the domestic  debate  on  trade  liberalization,  at least  in countries  with lower
levels of support,  is  likely to  focus  as much  on  "equity"  concerns  as it is  on
"trade  distortions."  The  argument  will  be that  any money  given  to farmers
makes them more competitive and is thus trade distorting.  On one level, this is
a spurious  argument, because direct payments, especially when they are tied to
fixed assets, e.g. land, will be quickly capitalized into asset values.  These pay-
ments then make producers in that country less competitive and more " at risk"
from the removal of support.  However, there is a "wealth"  effect that encour-
ages production  and makes  the removal  of protection  extremely  difficult.  In
9 The  term zero-for-zero  is  used to indicate  a commodity  which receives  no export
subsidies  and is not protected by border measures.  Commodities  suggested  for zero-
for-zero include oilseeds and products,  pork,  and malting barley.
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Table  3:  OECD-24  Producer Support Estimate,  by Type  of Support
($US  billion).
Type of Support  1986-88  1998P  percent change
Total  220.6  251.1  13.8
Market Price  Support  169.8  167.2  -1.5
Payments  based on:
-output  12.7  9.2  -27.6
- area planted  15.3  33.9  121.6
- historical entitlements  0.2  9.8  4,900.0
- input use  17.0  19.9  17.0
- input constraints  3.0  7.2  140.0
- whole farm income  1.1  1.5  36.4
- miscellaneous  1.5  2.5  66.7
Source:  OECD,  1999.
P  =  preliminary
addition,  when payments  that appear  to be  decoupled from production  deci-
sions are de facto provided in a counter cyclical fashion it becomes  very diffi-
cult to argue  that these payments  are  only minimally trade  distorting.  Low-
cost and low-subsidy  agri-food exporters  are going to push for an elimination
of blue box payments  and tighter discipline  on  domestic  support.  Countries
with high levels of support will push for a continuation of the green box and its
expansion to take into account "multifunctionality".
Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary Regulations
The Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations and Tech-
nical  Barriers  to Trade  play  an important  role  in regulating the trade  in agri-
food products.  Trade in agri-food products produced using biotechnology was
not an  issue  during  the Uruguay  Round  of trade negotiations  but  today  this
issue is front page news.  Canada and the United States insist that trade barriers
can only be put in place when sound science supports their use.  The European
Union argues that the risks resulting from the use of products produced using
biotechnology  are  unknown  and therefore  the precautionary  principle  should
apply.  The  compromise  forged  in Seattle  was  to create  a  working  group on
biotechnology,  but this  agreement  died  with the  postponement  of the talks.
However, the draft Cartagena  Protocol on Biosafety adopted  at the Extraordi-
nary Conference  of the Parties (EXCOP) to the Convention on Biological Di-
Meilke and Huff 319320  NAFTA  -Report Card on Agriculture
versity in Montreal, this January, contains a number of important provisions:  1)
it allows  countries  to invoke  the precautionary  principle;  2) it calls  for ship-
ments of GMOs  to carry a label saying "may  contain GMOs"; and 3) it leaves
the  relationship  between  the Protocol  and the WTO Agreements  vague.  The
issues surrounding biotechnoloy are too complex to explore further in this short
paper,  but they  are bound to be divisive when the trade talks resume  (Phillips
and Kerr 2000).
One  of the  lessons  that came  out of the  Seattle  meetings  is that  the
views of developing  countries can no longer be ignored nor can these countries
be pressured  into another agreement. These are  considered in the next section.
DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  CONCERNS
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations more
than 30 new countries have joined the WTO.  The current membership consists
of 135 countries, most of them in the developing  world.  The developing  coun-
tries are not homogeneous,  ranging  from agricultural exporters  who are mem-
bers of the Cairns Group to countries that are large  net food importers.
Traditionally,  the  GATT/WTO  has made decisions  based  on  consen-
sus.  When the membership  was smaller  and more homogeneous  this method
of decision-making  served  the GATT/WTO  well.  However,  with a larger  and
more heterogeneous  membership  it is unclear if "consensus"  can  continue  to
be the way all decisions are made.  Even if consensus decision-making  contin-
ues,  a way  will have  to be found to give developing  countries greater voice  in
the  processes  leading  up to  decision  documents.  Developing  countries  argue
that during  the Uruguay  Round  they took on  additional  obligations,  particu-
larly in the area of intellectual property,  but they have not benefitted  as much
from  trade liberalization  as they were  promised,  particularly in clothing,  tex-
tiles and agri-food trade where developed country markets remain heavily pro-
tected (Anderson  1999,  Huff 2000).  They  also feel that new technologies  are
important to their economic progress and that the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property  Rights (TRIPS) has erected barriers to acquir-
ing this new knowledge.
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Developing  countries feel that as soon as they become competitive in
developed  country  markets  they  are  often subjected to  anti-dumping  actions.
At best, fighting  an anti-dumping  action is expensive,  and at worst it excludes
developing  country products  from developed country markets.  As a result, de-
veloping countries are asking developed countries to renew their commitments
to live up to the Uruguay Round agreement,  particularly for textiles  and cloth-
ing, before they will commit to a new round of negotiations.  In addition, they
would like the developed world to extend tariff free access, for all goods, to the
least  developed countries.
The developing world fears that developed countries will use stringent
environmental  and labour regulations  as  thinly disguised protectionism.  The
developing  world  sees its  large  endowment of unskilled  labour  as  its major
comparative  advantage  in gaining access  to developed  country  markets.  De-
veloping countries can  not compete in the high-growth,  high-technology mar-
kets dominated by the major developed countries.  The developing world's com-
parative  advantage  lies in supplying goods  that require,  and can be produced
with its abundant supply of unskilled labour.
In the past, developing countries have been offered "special and differ-
ential" treatment in the GATT/WTO.  This allowed developing countries longer
periods of time  to phase-in  trade liberalization  measures  and/or  made  them
subject to less stringent rules.  Perhaps it is time to rethink the way special and
differential treatment is handled by giving developing countries early and pref-
erential access  to developed country markets'°. The new agenda of trade liber-
alization,  including biotechnology, environment, labour, investment policy and
the restructuring  of the WTO combine with the anti-trade  stance  of the Civil
Society  and some developing  countries, to make agreement on  a broad multi-
lateral trade liberalization agreement difficult 1. It is the options to multilateral
1 0 Developing countries currently benefit from numerous preferential trading arrange-
ments,  such  as  the generalized  system  of preferences.  However,  these  schemes  are
normally  designed to protect developed  countries'_most import  sensitive sectors.
1  The Civil Society is a term used to describe  a large group of non-governmental
organizations  (NGO's) who champion causes from the environment and organized
labour,  to sustainable development.  It is not uncommon for these groups to hold an
anti-trade stance.
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liberalization  for  North America  that are  considered  in the remainder  of this
paper.
REGIONALISM  AND  MULTILATERALISM
While a way to begin a new round of trade negotiations will be found,
the  lag in starting  the negotiations  and the complexity of the agenda suggests
that new  disciplines  on agri-food  trade  will not come into  effect until late  in
this decade.  In  the mean time, countries will be looking  for ways  to advance
their  trading interests.  These  efforts,  at least  for  the  NAFTA  countries,  will
proceed  in  one  of four  ways:  1) bilateral  trade  accords;  2)  expansion  of the
NAFTA Agreement to a larger regional grouping, most likely through the Free
Trade of the Americas Initiative;  3) the deepening  of the NAFTA  through the
creation of a customs union;  and 4) the creation  of a monetary union.  Before
considering  these options it is useful to review a few points.
Regional  integration  agreements  are  WTO  legal if they include  sub-
stantially  all goods, create no new barriers to trade with non-members  and all
trade is free between  the members of the agreement.  However, regional inte-
gration agreements seldom comply completely with these criteria.  Viner (1950)
showed that a customs union can be either welfare enhancing  or welfare reduc-
ing depending on the size of its trade creation and trade diversion effects.  Since
Viner's  work,  numerous  studies  have  examined  the conditions  under  which
customs unions  will be welfare  enhancing, and when they will be welfare  de-
creasing12. In general,  as long  as the volume of trade between  member and
non-member nations increases, countries outside the customs union benefit (i.e.
little or no trade diversion). If in addition to no trade diversion with non-mem-
bers,  the volume  of trade  among  member nations  increases  (trade  creation),
their welfare  is  enhanced.  However,  free  trade agreements  create  distortions
that do not exist in customs unions.  With  a free trade  agreement each nation
maintains  its  own  external  border protection.  As  a  result,  complex  rules  of
origin are necessary to keep "foreign" products  from entering the FTA through
the country with the lowest external tariff.  While rules of origin are difficult to
12 For a guide to this literature see Krueger (1999) and dell'Aquilla, Sarker and Meilke
(1999).
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administer for all goods, they may be unenforceable  for many raw agricultural
products.  Lax rules of origin should reduce  the likelihood of trade diversion
from non-members but also reduce  trade creation  with members.
The debate within the economics profession on the question of whether
regional  integration  agreements  are building-blocks  or  stumbling-blocks  to
multilateral  trade  liberalization  has been  heated.  Krueger  (1999)  provides  a
summary  of the arguments  and  they won't be repeated  here.  However,  two
facts  are  worthy  of mention.  First,  world trade  in manufactured  goods  and
processed agri-food products  has become more regionalized since the  1960's.
In fact, the patterns of increasing  regionalism for manufactured products  and
processed  agri-food  product trade  are  quite  similar  (Anderson  and  Norheim
1993,  dell'Aquilla, Sarker and Meilke  1999).  In both cases, increased region-
alism is consistent with growing openness and multilateral interdependence.  It
is  this effect that dominates  the empirical  studies  surveyed by  Robinson  and
Thierfelder (1998).  They found that trade creation greatly exceeds trade diver-
sion in virtually all of the regional integration agreements studied.  The counter
example is raw agricultural product trade.  Like trade in processed agricultural
products,  trade in raw products  has become  more regionalized.  However,  in
this case there is clear evidence of the impact of trade and domestic policies on
regional trading patterns.  For raw products,  the pattern of regionalism is con-
sistent with losses  in welfare  borne  mainly  by the European  Union,  and raw
agricultural product exporters  (dell'Aquilla,  Sarker and Meilke  1998).
THE  ROAD AHEAD
The failure to launch a new trade round in December 1999 represents a
pause  in the move  towards  more liberal  trading relationships.  However,  the
claimed  "success"  of the Civil Society in derailing the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment and their presence in Seattle means the conduct of trade negotia-
tions  will never be quite the same.  Countries  do not engage in trade negotia-
tions to enhance global  welfare, they engage in trade negotiations  to promote
their  own special  interests.  If,  in the process world welfare  increases,  that is
well and good, but self-interest  is the driving force.  Consequently,  countries
are  always examining  alternatives  to multilateral  freer trade,  and this  is  even
more the case when the multilateral process  is stagnant or stalemated.  Some of
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these  alternatives  will be pursued in tandem  with multilateral efforts.  Each of
these  alternatives  involves regional  integration agreements,  and each  has dif-
ferent  implications  for agri-food trade for the NAFTA countries.
Bilateral Accords
Each of the NAFTA countries has bilateral trade agreements with non-
NAFTA  countries.  In  fact,  for agri-food  the NAFTA  agreement  is  a  set of
bilateral accords rather than the trilateral agreement that governs trade in manu-
factured goods.  As  a consequence,  agri-food  trade between the United States
and Mexico will be tariff free after the implementation period, but this will not
be the case for Canada-United States, or Canada-Mexico  trade (Meilke and van
Duren  1996).  Recently, Mexico negotiated a bilateral accord with the EU.  As
a result, Mexico will have  preferential access  to the two largest markets in the
world,  the United  States  and  the European  Union 1 3. According  to press  re-
leases, all industrial tariffs on Mexico-EU trade will fall to zero by 2007.  How-
ever, for agri-food only 62 percent of trade will be fully liberalized.  The Mexico-
EU agreement illustrates the problem with bilateral accords;  it is just too easy
to take  significant portions of agri-food trade off the table.  In addition, given
the sensitivities  of agri-food trade within the NAFTA countries,  additional  bi-
lateral accords  are going to raise questions about the origin of agri-food prod-
ucts and  about  third countries  using bilateral  accords  as  a backdoor  into the
NAFTA relationship.  Some of these problems could be avoided by the conver-
sion of the  NAFTA into a customs union.
North American  Customs  Union
The  movement from  a free trade area  to a customs union is  a logical
next step  in the deepening of the North American accord'4. In many respects,
the creation of a customs union with the three current members of NAFTA is a
more logical  step than the expansion of the free trade area.  Data on the degree
1 3 An argument could be made that Mexico is now the "hub" in a hub-and-spoke  model
of trade (Wonnacott  1991).
1 4 A customs union is a regional integration agreement where member countries
have common external tariffs (Markusen,  et. al  1995).  A deeper form of integration
involves the creation of common institutions  and policies, as in the European Union.
For this discussion, the weaker form of integration,  involving only common external
tariffs is assumed.
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of divergence of MFN tariffs among Canada, Mexico  and the United States,  at
the  individual  product level,  is required  to determine  the  size of the  adjust-
ments  a customs union would  require.  If external  tariffs were lowered to the
level applied by the member country with the lowest MFN tariff there would be
no concern about trade diversion.
A major  sticking  point is likely to  be Canada's tariff rate quotas for
supply managed products.  The price gap between Canada and the United States
for milk remains significant,  although for chicken it is much smaller than in the
mid-1980s.  Meilke,  Sarker and Le Roy (1998) argue that North American free
trade in dairy products would involve a significant loss in milk production quota
value in Canada, but that trade in dairy products between Canada and the United
States would be small.  It will be interesting to see how much milk is produced
outside of Ontario's domestic milk quota under the recently announced export
regime  (Core 2000).  If the quantities  are significant it will provide additional
evidence that Ontario milk producers can compete within an open North Ameri-
can market.  The full integration  of North American  agri-food trade seems  in-
evitable, but whether it will precede or lag multilateral liberalization is difficult
to predict.
Expansion  of the NAFTA
The negotiations to create a 34 country Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas' 5(FTAA) were initiated in April 1998.  The 34 countries include: tiny island
nations like St. Kitts; the poorest-of-the-poor  such as Haiti with a GDP of less
than $500/person;  major agri-food exporters like Argentina and Brazil; and an
industrial giant,  the United States  with a GDP of about $31,000/person.  Cre-
ation of the FTAA involving nearly  800 million people is a huge undertaking
with a stated completion date of 2005.  The negotiating agenda for the FTAA is
essentially the multilateral  agenda with all of the problems and advantages that
brings.  Negotiations  on agri-food  will be more difficult than among  the three
NAFTA countries.  Argentina and Brazil are  unlikely to accept domestic agri-
cultural subsidies in Canada and the United States that are several times larger
than theirs.  In addition, they are unlikely to agree to poor FTAA member coun-
15 For a discussion of the potential for the formation of the FTAA, see Burfisher (2000)
and Furtan (2000).
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tries  accepting  agri-food  export  subsidies  from the European  Union, or from
other nations within the FTAA.  Given the  complexity of the issues to be  re-
solved it is difficult to see the FTAA negotiations being completed prior to the
next round of multilateral negotiations unless there is a complete breakdown of
the multilateral  process.
Monetary  Union
There has been some discussion in Canada of the formation of a mon-
etary union with the United States.  It has taken the European Union more than
30 years to progress  from a  customs  union to a monetary  union  and it is un-
likely that moves  towards  a  monetary  union  in North America  will  proceed
much  quicker.  Partly  it is a symbolic  issue,  with nationalists  arguing a mon-
etary union is yet another example of their country giving up a sovereign right.
However,  in  economic  terms,  flexible  exchange  rates create  a  shock
absorber  that would not exist with a fixed  exchange rate regime.  Some argue
that the existence  of a flexible  exchange rate between  Canada and the United
States  has allowed  Canada to become  increasingly  unproductive,  postponing
the  inevitable  economic  corrections  that  must take  place.  Others  argue  that
flexible exchange  rates give  the government  one more policy lever that it can
use to keep Canada out of a deep and long  lasting  recession.  There  is some
truth in both arguments.  The long secular decline in the Canada/United States
exchange rate from 99 cents  Canadian to the U.S. dollar in 1974, to $1.48 Ca-
nadian  to the U.S.  dollar in  1999 is  a sign of reduced productivity  in Canada
relative to the United States.  However, the nearly 15 percent devaluation of the
Canadian  dollar between  October  1997  and October  1998,  and its revaluation
by  eight percent  since  then  was more easily  accommodated  in a  flexible  ex-
change rate regime.
CONCLUSIONS
Little is certain  about the future direction of trade liberalization in the
agri-food  sector.  The multilateral  negotiations  on agriculture  will be handled
by  the  WTO  Committee  on  Agriculture,  with  the first session  scheduled  for
March  23-24,  2000.  Technical  work  is required to define  the scope  and the
mandate  for the agricultural  negotiations.  However,  some member  countries
326 NAFTA - Report Card  on AgricultureMeilke and Huff  327
have already announced they will not attend the sessions.  The developing coun-
tries remain  skeptical  of the process and the civil  society is antagonistic.  On
the plus  side many developing countries share the NAFTA countries desire for
more open agri-food  markets.
If the multilateral  negotiations  fail to make progress  then the NAFTA
countries will explore  other alternatives.  The  most dangerous  route would be
for the NAFTA countries to enter into a series of bilateral accords.  These could
undermine the multilateral trading system and possibly NAFTA itself.  Conver-
sion  of the NAFTA  into  a customs  union  seems  a logical  next  step,  but the
special  trade  arrangements  for Canada's  supply  managed  commodities  are  a
stumbling  block.
Negotiating the FTAA presents many of the same issues as negotiating
at  the  multilateral  level,  with  the  exception that  the European  Union  is not
involved.  For  this reason,  finding compromises  within  the  FTAA countries
will be easier than at the multilateral  level, but the huge differences  in agricul-
tural support within the FTAA will be a problem.  Unfortunately,  most of the
problems confronting agri-food trade can not be solved within a Western Hemi-
sphere free trade area that is dominated by the interests of agri-food  exporters.
What is needed, is a strong multilateral effort in agriculture that pays more than
lip service  to achieving  meaningful reductions  in tariffs  and  a clear path  to-
wards the elimination of harmful subsidization practices.
Achieving agri-food trade liberalization has always been difficult.  On
that score nothing has changed.  The  current situation  of extremely  depressed
prices  for many  agricultural products  heightens  the urgency  for trade  liberal-
ization, while  at the same time making it more difficult.  At best, the failure to
launch  a new round in Seattle  only postponed the benefits of more open mar-
kets. In the short run, however, there is a danger that countries wishing to assist
their economically depressed farmers will resort to unacceptable domestic sup-
port programs, increased use of contingent protection and antidumping actions,
as well as backsliding  in their current reduction commitments.  The traditional
problem of selling freer trade in agri-food products domestically,  plus the emer-
gence of other flash points like biotechnology,  investment policy  and intellec-
tual property rights, provide the opportunity for groups like the Policy Disputes
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Information  Consortium  to highlight the benefits of further market liberaliza-
tion through the provision and exchange of research and information.
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